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	Comments on: Voting Sucks Because it Leads to Bigger Numbers but Lower Quality Decisions	</title>
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		By: clay shentrup		</title>
		<link>https://mgrush.com/blog/voting-sucks/#comment-135161</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[clay shentrup]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Sep 2023 21:59:57 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[&#062; Results:  The approach does little to distinguish between acceptable options and outstanding options. Results have been known to be highly erratic.

i would strongly disagree with this assessment. i&#039;ve studied voting theory for almost 20 years, was mentioned in the 2008 book &quot;gaming the vote&quot; by william poundstone, and co-founded the center for election science. full disclosure: ces promotes approval voting.

the intensity of support between different options actually impacts the strategic &quot;approval threshold&quot;, as explained here by by me, but citing the research of a princeton math phd named warren smith, who is arguably history&#039;s greatest expert on voting methods. (smith owns the site and served as an editor on this.)

https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6

few voters are this mathematically precise, but this is indeed the strategy the intuitively use to a close approximation. e.gh. i really prefer elizabeth warren, but biden&#039;s not too bad and i&#039;m really worried about trump winning, so i&#039;m going to lower my threshold and approve them both.&quot;


the aggregate result of these kinds of strategies over a variety of voting methods has been studied via computer simulation by both warren smith and contemporaries like jameson quinn, a harvard stats phd who also served with myself and smith on the board of ces. some results summarized here:

https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6
https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/

suffice to say, that approval voting performs extremely well, and tends to elect the condorcet winner whenever one exists.

clay shentrup
portland, or]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&gt; Results:  The approach does little to distinguish between acceptable options and outstanding options. Results have been known to be highly erratic.</p>
<p>i would strongly disagree with this assessment. i&#8217;ve studied voting theory for almost 20 years, was mentioned in the 2008 book &#8220;gaming the vote&#8221; by william poundstone, and co-founded the center for election science. full disclosure: ces promotes approval voting.</p>
<p>the intensity of support between different options actually impacts the strategic &#8220;approval threshold&#8221;, as explained here by by me, but citing the research of a princeton math phd named warren smith, who is arguably history&#8217;s greatest expert on voting methods. (smith owns the site and served as an editor on this.)</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6" rel="nofollow ugc">https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6</a></p>
<p>few voters are this mathematically precise, but this is indeed the strategy the intuitively use to a close approximation. e.gh. i really prefer elizabeth warren, but biden&#8217;s not too bad and i&#8217;m really worried about trump winning, so i&#8217;m going to lower my threshold and approve them both.&#8221;</p>
<p>the aggregate result of these kinds of strategies over a variety of voting methods has been studied via computer simulation by both warren smith and contemporaries like jameson quinn, a harvard stats phd who also served with myself and smith on the board of ces. some results summarized here:</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6" rel="nofollow ugc">https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6</a><br />
<a href="https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/" rel="nofollow ugc">https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/</a></p>
<p>suffice to say, that approval voting performs extremely well, and tends to elect the condorcet winner whenever one exists.</p>
<p>clay shentrup<br />
portland, or</p>
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